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A potential threat to the effectiveness of institutions in Latin
America promoting small and medium-sized enterprise
(SME) development is that these programmes might become
clientelistic agencies, advancing interests other than the
welfare of the SMEs themselves. As governments in Latin
America have adopted more market-oriented policies,
however, government institutions in the region that promote
SMEs are undergoing a similar transformation. Our
hypothesis is that two factors, the extent to which an
institution has adopted market-oriented practices and its
degree of autonomy (both from government and from
societal interest groups), are what determine its level of
accountability, as measured by the extent to which the
institution conducts systematic, independent evaluations of
the impact of its programmes. The four cases examined here
(SEBRAE in Brazil, NAFIN in Mexico, CORFO in Chile and
SEPYME in Argentina) show that the hypothesis is valid for
government institutions, but less so for private institutions
with assured budgets.
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I
Introduction
For a number of reasons, governments in Latin America
have long promoted the development of local small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Governments do this
primarily because SMEs provide employment1 and
contribute to local economic growth and development.
Nevertheless, a potential threat to the effectiveness of
institutions in Latin America promoting SME
development is that these programmes might become
clientelistic agencies, advancing the interests of
individual politicians rather than the welfare of the SMEs
themselves. As governments in Latin America have
adopted more market-oriented policies, however,
government institutions in the region that promote SMEs
are undergoing a similar transformation. Our hypothesis
is that two factors, the extent to which these institutions
have adopted market-oriented practices and their degree
of autonomy (both from the government and from
societal interest groups), are what determine their level
of accountability, as measured by the extent to which
the institution conducts systematic, independent
evaluations of the impact of its programmes. This
article examines and compares the practices and
organizational structure of four different institutions
–the Secretariat for Small and Medium-sized
Enterprises (SEPYME) in Argentina, the Brazilian
Assistance Service for Micro and Small Enterprises
(SEBRAE) in Brazil, the Chilean Economic
Development Agency (CORFO) in Chile and Nacional
Financiera, S.N.C. (NAFIN) in Mexico– in order to
assess the validity of this hypothesis.
II
The theoretical context
Debates about the role of SMEs in Latin America have
continued since the International Labour Organization
(ILO) published an early study on SMEs in Kenya in 1972
(ILO, 1972). In the 1980s, one influential study by the
Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC) concluded that there was an
enormous gap between the hopes governments in Latin
America placed in these types of firms, and the available
evidence of their genuine potential.2 As larger
enterprises developed technologically, SMEs played an
ever smaller role in the region’s economic development.
Although this problem resulted from a number of
factors, the growing productivity gap between larger
enterprises and SMEs was probably most important.
However, another part of the problem was that,
increasingly, SMEs were either not part of the more
efficient, more technologically adept larger enterprises’
production processes at all, or participated in them only
in a subordinated way, as “junior partners” to the larger
firms.
A recent study that describes the performance of
small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises
(SMMEs) in 10 Latin American countries since the
second half of the 1980s under the “new economic
model” comes to three controversial conclusions (Peres
and Stumpo, 2000). First, macroeconomic conditions
1 SMEs employ between 40% and 50% of the workforce in Latin
America (see Alburquerque, 1997, p. 155). Small and medium-sized
manufacturing accounts for a large share of employment in the
manufacturing sector: 45% in Argentina (1993), 67% in Brazil
(1997), 53% in Chile (1996) and 45% in Mexico (1993), according
to Peres and Stumpo, 2000, pp. 1643 to 1655.
2
 According to the overall information for Latin America in the
1980s, SMEs had a very limited position in the economic structure,
showed a preference for domestic markets, and generally did not
play a leadership role in the economic, political or institutional
spheres. SMEs were usually oriented towards mass consumer goods,
the utilization of rudimentary technology, and lack of inter-
enterprise cooperation. Within firms, these factors give rise to many
problems, including inadequate production conditions, an
extraordinarily conservative management approach, a detrimental
form of dependency on input and product markets, problems with
access to financing and a low level of manpower skill.
71C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 9  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 3
ACCOUNTABILITY IN  GOVERNMENT PROGRAMMES TO PROMOTE SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED
ENTERPRISES  •  MARIO CASTILLO AND ROY C. NELSON
have been the main determinants of SMME performance;
second, trade liberalization has had a strong impact on
sectoral restructuring within SMME production; and
third, the effects of public policies aimed at fostering
SMME development can be eliminated as an important
factor. According to this study, in most countries, with
the exception of Brazil and Mexico, public policies have
had little impact because of a lack of financial and
human resources and fragmented decision-making
among government agencies.
While we would agree with the importance of
macroeconomic conditions and the level of trade
liberalization in promoting SME development, we would
argue that the nature of the public agencies promoting
SMEs can also have an impact. Whether the impact is
positive or negative depends upon the specific
characteristics and policies of the agency concerned.
As late as the 1980s, traditional government
programmes to support the development of SMEs
consisted largely of direct subsidies. The usual kind of
subsidy consisted of loans with easy terms, such as low
interest rates and long repayment periods. Since these
were loans from the government, rather than
commercial banks, many SMEs found that they could
renegotiate the terms or postpone making payments.
In this period, the majority of the national development
banks in Latin America had a high-risk exposure with
a low quality of loan portfolio. Over time, policy makers
realized that making government loans to SMEs was not
an effective policy.3
In response to these difficult lessons, as well as to
the new consensus in Latin America in favour of
economic restructuring, government officials decided
that they would not only have to restructure government
institutions designed to promote SMEs, but would also
have to reformulate their policies towards SMEs.
In Brazil, CEBRAE (Brazilian Support Centre for
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises), the government
institution promoting SMEs, became SEBRAE (Brazilian
Assistance Service for Micro and Small Enterprises), a
private agency, in 1990. In Chile, CORFO (Chilean
Economic Development Agency) began its own
restructuring in 1990. In Mexico, NAFIN (Nacional
Financiera, S.N.C.) began this transformation in 1989.
In Argentina, lastly, Congress approved a special law
in 1995 (Estatuto legal para las pyme) to promote SMEs.
In 1997, SEPYME (Secretariat for Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises) was created under the direct authority
of the President.
All of this was consistent with the so-called
“Washington Consensus” on economic reform in Latin
America —a term United States economist John
Williamson had coined to denote the set of market-
oriented policies favoured by Washington, D.C. based
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank
(Williamson, 1990).
Some Latin American authors, while agreeing on
the importance of market-oriented policies, argued that
there were some important differences between the
views in Washington and Latin America on this topic.
The IMF, for example, concerned with budget deficits,
tended to maintain that government spending generally
was anathema to reform, and government programmes
should be cut across the board. At least some Latin
American policy makers argued, however, that some
government spending –for example, spending on
programmes to promote SMEs– could, if the SMEs
prospered, eventually bring in more tax revenues and
enhance a country’s fiscal situation in the long run
(Pereira, 1992; Edwards, 1995). Reducing government
“bloat” and inefficiency was essential, the Latin
American authors argued; but indiscriminate cuts in
spending programmes were not necessarily warranted
or a good idea for a country’s long-term economic
development.4
Regardless of these differing views, the new, more
market-oriented approach meant that as government
institutions cut their budgets and reduced their payrolls,
the kinds of economic programmes they advocated
changed as well. Now, the emphasis was on providing
financial services through the private banking system
(rather than direct loans from government institutions).
Also, increasingly, government institutions sought to
develop a different model for action altogether by
providing non-financial services (sometimes known as
“business development services”, or BDS). Such services
included providing technical assistance, promoting
technological innovation, and facilitating business
linkages.
The prevailing Washington Consensus compelled
government institutions to reform their structures and
3
 The traditional policies to support SMEs consisted of direct State
action through State financial agencies, which channelled credit to
SMEs at subsidized interest rates. The poor performance of these
policies resulted from the emphasis on subsidized credit and the
poor management of loan portfolios. This situation required many
institutions to undergo financial restructuring (see Castillo, 1993;
Held, 1995).
4 In the context of the Argentine crisis, policy makers are
questioning the Washington consensus ever further.
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policies. In the same way, the Committee of Donor
Agencies for Small Enterprise Development (also
known as the Donor Committee) was also influential
in bringing about this emphasis on the part of
government institutions to provide non-financial
services. The Donor Committee was composed of
representatives from international institutions, such as
the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB) and the International Labour Organization (ILO),
that work to promote the development of SMEs. In the
mid-1990s, this organization helped define the
standards for best practices in financial services. In the
late 1990s, the Donor Committee devised a preliminary
set of guidelines for best practices in non-financial
services. However, non-financial services include a
wider array of activities than financial services.
Therefore, it has been more difficult for the Donor
Committee to offer fixed guidelines for such activities.5
Nevertheless, those working in this field are well
aware that certain principles and practices are more
likely to be effective than others. Most important, any
institution working to promote development of SMEs in
Latin America should be market-oriented, i.e., should
have the specific needs of the clients themselves (rather
than some narrow political objective) in mind. Despite
the new consensus in favour of market-oriented policies
and practices in Latin America, some SME programmes
still fall short of achieving this goal. Moreover, some
lack institutional autonomy from government. These
two factors, we maintain, are important in determining
the level of accountability of these organizations, which
is central to an agency’s overall effectiveness.
The model we have developed (see section IV
below) seeks to explain the factors that lead to
accountable government programmes to promote the
development of SMEs in Latin America. Before
proceeding to a more specific discussion of the model,
however, we provide in the next section further
background and political context on the four institutions
we assess in this article. This is important in order to
understand the current structure of these institutions
and the political, economic and organizational context
in which they have been operating since experiencing
the dramatic changes in Latin America in the last
decade. While each institution has been transformed
by these changes, each has also emerged with somewhat
different organizational structures. Once we have
explained these differences, we can present the model,
which shows how these different structures affect each
institution’s level of accountability.
III
The changing institutional environment
1. The challenge of institutional transition
The transformation of development institutions in Latin
America began with the process of financial
liberalization that started in the 1970s. As the
deficiencies of the structuralist,6 government-
interventionist model for economic development
became more evident, the need for financial
liberalization was clear. By the mid-1970s, most Latin
American policy makers agreed that one of the principal
causes of Latin American countries’ low saving rates
was excessive government control of the financial
system, notably government control over credit
allocation and interest rates.
At the beginning of the 1980s, Latin American
governments began to focus their efforts on
restructuring their development banks in the context of
economic liberalization and the reform of the financial
system. Some countries, such as Chile and Argentina,
began this process early; others, such as Brazil and
Mexico,7 have undertaken it more recently. Since the
5
 Other organizations, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), through its Forum for Enterprise
Development, have encouraged the dissemination of best practices
related to finance, regulatory frameworks, taxation policies,
business networks, support services, e-commerce and cross-border
cooperation, among others (see OECD, 2002).
6
 The structuralist vision of the saving-investment process
encouraged policy makers to work towards a structural
transformation of the economy, implementing tax policies to
increase income tax revenues, establishing tax incentives for
investment, and creating “developmentalist” financial corporations
(see Rosales, 1988).
7An analysis of the role of development banks in the context of
financial liberalization in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico can
be found in ALIDE (1993).
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1990s, development institutions have not only reduced
their role in direct financing of development activities,
but have also begun to offer an array of non-financial
services.
In each country, government SME development
agencies have undergone a different kind of
restructuring. While Brazil, as mentioned earlier, chose
to privatize its SME development agency, CEBRAE (now
known as SEBRAE), Mexico decided to modernize its
development bank, NAFIN, but still keep it under
government control. In Chile, CORFO transferred
administrative duties of its SME programmes to private
intermediaries (the CORFO network), while Argentina’s
SEPYME was designed to maintain coordination of a
number of SME promotion activities under the direct
control of the Executive Branch.
In Brazil, the Collor administration terminated
several government-run SME programmes. In April
1990, the government SME institution, CEBRAE, was
privatized and renamed SEBRAE. While private, SEBRAE
was financed by a 0.3% government payroll tax levied
on firms in Brazil. SEBRAE’s new role was to assist SMEs
seeking to improve their organization, management,
technological capability and creditworthiness (Suzigan
and Villela, 1997). A non-profit institution, SEBRAE has
its headquarters in Brasilia and another 27 offices (one
located in each of Brazil’s 26 states, plus the federal
district).
SEBRAE’s structure makes it original and distinct
from other institutions promoting SMEs in Latin
America. Although, technically, SEBRAE’s funding still
comes from the government by means of the payroll
tax on firms, the amount provided to SEBRAE is not
subject to political debate in Brazil’s Congress, or to
the political whims of Brazil’s president, and SEBRAE
is in no other way linked to the federal government.
The amount is 0.3% of Brazilian firms’ payroll in any
given year. This insulates SEBRAE from political debate
over the nature of its activities. The Brazilian
government cannot withhold funding from SEBRAE
unless it changes the 0.3% financing law by an act of
Congress. In comparison with the other cases
considered here, SEBRAE has a high level of autonomy
over its budget as well as in its decision-making.
In Mexico, as a result of the country’s new
economic model, NAFIN has been subject to deep
changes in practically all areas. In 1989, NAFIN initiated
a modernization programme under the framework for
consolidating financial intermediaries. After 55 years
as a traditional development bank, NAFIN underwent a
restructuring that included many austerity measures
(NAFIN, 1998). While remaining a government
institution, NAFIN is seeking to become a modern
development bank, working to promote new financial
intermediaries, to bring venture capital to develop new
investment, and to provide non-financial services for
SMEs such as technical assistance and training. Under
Mexico’s laws, NAFIN’s board is composed primarily
of government officials and remains under the control
of the government. The principal sources of NAFIN’s
budget, as NAFIN itself indicates in its annual report
(NAFIN, 1997, p. 14), are loans from international
development institutions such as the World Bank and
IDB, lines of credit from foreign banks, and the
placement of securities in the domestic and international
markets.
Thus, NAFIN is a case of an institution that has its
own independent budget, yet still remains under
government control. The decision-making process in
NAFIN remains largely under the control of central
government through NAFIN’s government-appointed
board of directors. Of the cases considered in this
article, NAFIN represents a high level of budgetary
autonomy, but a low level of decision-making
autonomy.
In Chile, CORFO, created in 1939, was at one time
a traditional development bank as well as a holding
company for public enterprises. However, in the last
10 years CORFO has undergone a major restructuring.
In 1990, CORFO decided to end its direct action as a
financial institution. Its goal thenceforth was to provide,
through the private financial system, long-term
resources to the business sector that were compatible
with the development of investment projects. In 1992,
CORFO began to develop new programmes for the
modernization of SMEs. The main programmes were
promotion of technological innovation, cooperative
development and technical assistance. Since 1993,
CORFO has systematically transferred the administrative
duties of these mechanisms and the allocation of its
resources to private intermediaries in order to attain
greater efficiency and coverage in its activities.8
Like NAFIN, CORFO has some assets of its own. It
can obtain loans from international lending institutions.
8
 In 1997, consistent with this objective, Chile’s laws regarding
CORFO were modified. Under the new arrangements, CORFO’s Board
now includes representatives from the private sector, as well as
representatives from the agricultural and foreign ministries. CORFO
has now outsourced the management of its company holdings to a
separate committee, and CORFO itself is devoted entirely to
promoting SMEs.
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However, the Chilean Congress must approve CORFO’s
annual budget. In relation to the other cases considered
here, CORFO represents an intermediate level of
autonomy from the central government, in terms of both
its budget and its decision-making capability.
In Argentina, many different public institutions
–such as the Ministry of the Economy, the Secretary
of Industry, Commerce, and Mining and the Federal
Investment Council, among others– used to have a
number of separate programmes to promote SMEs.
In 1995, the Argentine Congress approved the “SME
statute”. This law focused on technical and financial
assistance for SMEs and a system of reciprocal
guarantees and labour relations for these firms. In
order to put this law into effect, the Executive
Branch created a special secretariat called SEPYME
in 1997.
SEPYME’s purpose was to coordinate the Argentine
government’s various SME programmes. In the
beginning, SEPYME had the status of a ministry and was
under the direct authority of the President of Argentina.
Its budget served only to support its activities in
coordinating the other government SME programmes,
not actually to implement these programmes. Also,
although SEPYME had political authority over SME
programmes, it lacked administrative authority over
personnel working in the various ministries that were
charged with executing them. Therefore, while SEPYME
lacked autonomy from the government in its budget
and its decision-making process, its autonomy was
further weakened by its lack of direct control and
responsibility over the programmes it coordinated. Of
the cases analysed here, SEPYME represents a very low
level of both budgetary and decision-making autonomy.
Although SEPYME is now under the authority of the
Ministry of Production, it still possesses less autonomy
from the government than the other institutions we
analyse here.
2. Multilateral institutions: guidelines
for obtaining assistance
Multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank, IDB
and the Donor Committee, have an important role in
designing, implementing and financing SME
programmes in Latin America. If government
institutions want to get financial assistance from any
of these organizations, they need at a minimum to
comply with the requirements laid down by them.
Assistance from multilateral organizations is often part
of a package, all of which is conditional upon meeting
certain objectives, such as structural adjustment and
economic reform.
Significantly, by the mid-1990s the World Bank,
one of the main institutions that Williamson (1990)
had defined as being part of the Washington
Consensus, had begun to emphasize the importance
of institutions in promoting economic
competitiveness. Noting the success of East Asian
countries during the previous three decades, where
the State had a key role in promoting economic
development, the World Bank began to rethink the role
of the State in this process. This new thinking was
reflected in the 1993 World Bank study, East Asian
Miracle (World Bank, 1993). Recent World Bank
publications have continued to emphasize the
importance of the State in promoting development,
and have explicitly referred to shortcomings in the
old approach with such titles as Beyond the Washington
Consensus: Institutions matter (Burk and Perry, 1998)
and More instruments and broader goals: Moving
toward the post-Washington consensus (Stiglitz,
1998).
IDB is the most important donor agency providing
resources to institutions that promote SMEs in Latin
America. Table 1 indicates the extent of that support
for each of our country cases.
Multilateral institutions transfer not only money
but also best practices. The Donor Committee, for
example, has a clear vision of what it considers to be
the best practices for SME programmes in Latin America.
In its 1997 report on business development services
for SMEs, it listed numerous guidelines, all related to
the overarching aim of developing “business-like
organizations”, that institutions working to provide non-
financial business development services should follow.
These include developing a “business-like vision and
corporate culture”, “a high degree of autonomy from
government”, “management systems to introduce or
simulate market mechanisms” and “the technical
capacity to adapt or develop new products” (The Donor
Committee, 1997). Although these guidelines are
clearly part of the institutional environment in which
SME programmes are designed, it is difficult to know
the exact influence that they have on government
institutions in Latin America.
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IV
The model
principles and instruments that institutions promoting SMEs
should adopt. This explains why we do not find significant
variation between our cases with regard to the independent
variable, namely the extent to which the institution
promoting SMEs is market-driven. In fact, our analysis
shows that each of the four institutions in our study has
similar programmes promoting market-oriented policies
for SMEs. In order to make this assessment, we examine
three major programmes that each institution has
developed for promoting SMEs: business consulting,
technological development and business networking.
TABLE 1
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB): Activities
supporting SMEs, 1990-1998
(Millions of dollars)
Brazil Chile Mexico Argentina Total
Financial supporta 550 358 587 300 1,795
Non-financial supportb 250 40 250 254 794
Science and technologyc 160 68 180 95 503
Loan support and
regulatory reform – 150d 250e 675f 1,075




 Business productivity support programmes.
c
 Science and technology programme.
d
 Financial reform improving access to formal sources of credit.
e
 Trade regulation, tariffs, customs and other aspects of the trade system.
f
 Financial reform, legal framework, trade regulation and business environment.
In our model (figure 1), the extent to which the
institution promoting SMEs is market-driven (has
adopted market-oriented practices) is the independent
variable. The autonomy of the institution is the
intervening variable. The dependent variable is the
institution’s level of accountability.
1. Independent variable
Because of the strong influence of multilateral lending
institutions, there is a widespread consensus about the
FIGURE 1
Market orientation, autonomy and accountability





Autonomy of government institution
• Legal status, breadth of representation
or
Autonomy of private institution
• Breadth of representation
Accountability
• Accounting of programmes
• Programme evaluations
Independent variable Intervening variable Dependent variable
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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The measures and indicators we use for assessing
the extent of market orientation for each programme
are the following:
i) Performance orientation
Indicator: Co-financing. Does the institution
practise co-financing of projects?
ii) Client focus
Indicator: Client design. Does the institution
incorporate any client designs into its projects?
iii) Outsourcing
Indicator: Outsourcing. Is there outsourcing to
private institutions?
2. Intervening variable
Although there may be little difference among the
institutions with regard to our independent variable,
there are important differences in the intervening
variable, the level of autonomy of the institution
promoting SME development. The four country cases
differ widely in this regard.
The level of autonomy of an institution means its
ability to implement broad government objectives
without becoming captive to the interests of particular
groups, either within the government or in society at
large, that want to advance their own narrow interests.
Given the difficulty with clientelism in Latin America,
SME programmes are susceptible to becoming captured
in this way by specific interest groups. Our hypothesis
is that institutions that can avoid such political
interference will have a higher level of accountability,
as defined by their conducting systematic, independent
evaluations of their own programmes.
We use different measures for the “autonomy”
variable in government and private institutions. One
aspect of autonomy in government institutions is legal
autonomy, or the independence of the institution from
government control. A greater degree of independence
would make the institution less susceptible to political
interference from groups within the government,
including the president, seeking to advance narrow
political ends. Another measure of autonomy is
breadth of representation on the board of directors. A
broad representation from different government
ministries and the private sector would tend to prevent
the institution from becoming “captured” or controlled
by particular societal groups pursuing their own
interests. Private institutions would tend automatically
to have legal autonomy, but would still be prone to
being captured by individual societal groups. For
private institutions, then, our sole measure for
autonomy is the breadth of representation on the
institution’s board of directors.
The measures and indicators for each kind of
institution for the “autonomy” variable are as follows:
a) Government institutions
i) Legal autonomy
Indicator: Is the institution part of the national
government structure (least autonomous), a
separate ministry (intermediate autonomy) or a
public agency (most autonomous)?9
ii) Breadth of representation
Indicator: How broad is the societal
representation on the board of directors? Is just
one sector represented, or a wide range of




Indicator: How broad is the societal
representation on the board of directors? Is just
one sector represented, or a wide range of
sectors? Is there broad private and public
representation?
3. Dependent variable
For the dependent variable, namely the level of
accountability of SME programmes, the indicators are
the number and quality of the evaluations the institution
does of its own SME programmes. Our assumption is
that institutions that are not doing systematic
evaluations of their programmes will be less effective
at promoting SME development.
The measure and indicators we used are as follows:
a) Accounting of services provided
Indicator: Does the institution provide data/
statistics on what services were provided and
where?
b) Programme evaluations
Indicator: Is there evidence that the institution
conducts systematic, independent evaluations of
the impact of specific programmes?
9
 It would also be useful to have an indicator for the professional
capabilities of the institution, such as how many professionals
(economists, lawyers, engineers, etc.) work for it and what kind of
gap exists between salaries for professionals at a given institution
in comparison with professionals in the private sector. However,
this information is difficult to obtain. We believe that the legal
status indicator is both the most important and sufficient for our
purposes here.
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V
The cases of Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Argentina
1. Why these countries? Why these institutions?
Almost every country in Latin America has institutions
that promote the development of SMEs. We chose to
focus on Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Argentina not only
because these are important countries, with large SME
programmes, but also because the main institutions
working to promote SMEs in these countries have each
undergone extensive institutional reform. Currently,
each one, while similar in goals, represents a different
strategic model of how to promote SMEs.
Since being privatized in 1990, SEBRAE has
represented a private model for SME promotion. Its
Board of Directors has representatives from both the
public and private sector. Mexico’s NAFIN is a more
traditional government development bank. Although it
does have representatives from the private sector on its
Board of Directors, government officials on the Board
are referred to as “series ‘A’ advisers”, while
representatives from the private sector on the Board are
referred to as “series ‘B’ advisers”, denoting their lesser
status. In contrast, CORFO, Chile’s government
development agency, has government officials on its
Board from several different ministries, plus two
representatives from the private sector, appointed by
Chile’s President. It also uses a very non-traditional
approach to promoting SMEs. CORFO serves as a
coordinating agency, doing much of its work through
private actors that are usually organized into industry
associations. SEPYME in Argentina has evolved over
time. In the beginning, it was directly under the
authority of the President of the Republic, and therefore
lacking in autonomy. More recently, it has been
reorganized under the authority of the Ministry of
Production. Nevertheless, so far it represents a structure
that is less autonomous than the other institutions
considered here.
As table 2 shows, each of the four institutions, while
similar in some ways, differ considerably with regard
to their legal structure.
With regard to legal structure, at one extreme is
SEBRAE, a private corporation providing its own
services, not only to small firms but to microenterprises
as well. This structure gives the organization significant
independence from the government, yet institutional
clout at the same time. At the other extreme is SEPYME,
which operates only as a coordinator of other agencies.
In comparing the four institutions, we found that
each had programmes that were similar, both in title
and content. We examined three of the main
programmes: business consulting, technological
development and business networking. Table 3
summarizes key features of these programmes in each
country. The table shows, first, that the four institutions
analysed had very similar non-financial programmes,
and they all had business consulting and business
networking programmes. Only NAFIN in Mexico did
not have technological development programmes.
These institutions seem to be adopting very similar sorts
of “best practices”, as advocated by the Donor
Committee.
It is significant that even the wording of these
programmes is similar. The point is that they are all
fairly similar in the extent to which they are market-
driven. Our focus, therefore, is on the significant
differences in the intervening “autonomy” variable.
TABLE 2
Institutional framework for SME development
Country/Institution Category Legal structure Focus
Brazil/SEBRAE (1990) Non-financial services agency (NFSA) Private corporation Micro and small firms
Chile/CORFO (1939) NFSA and development bank Public corporation Small and medium-sized companies
Mexico/NAFIN (1934) NFSA and development bank National credit agency Small and medium-sized companies
Argentina/SEPYME (1997) Coordinator agency Sub-cabinet-level agency Small and medium-sized companies
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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VI
Results
The tables below provide a summary of our findings
on each institution, organized according to independent,
intervening, and dependent variables. We elaborate
further on these results in Section VII.
With regard to the independent variable, all the
institutions appear to be market-driven, at least in the
three areas we examined (business consulting,
technological development and business networking),
as table 4 shows. In assessing the criteria used to
determine the extent to which each institution is market-




Latin America (four countries): Main SME development
programmes, by country and category
Programme Brazil Chile Mexico Argentina
Business Programmes for Promotion projects Training and technical Business reorganization
consulting entrepreneur (PROFOs) assistance programme programme for exporters
development (COMPITE) (PRE)
Technological Technological support Technological and No programmea Argentine technology
development for micro and small productive development fund (FONTAR)
enterprises (PATME) fund (FONTEC)
Business Supplier qualification Supplier development Supplier Supplier development
networking programme (CF) programme (PDP) programme (PP) programme (PDP)
Source: SEBRAE: http://www.sebrae.com.br; CORFO: http://www.corfo.cl; NAFIN: http://www.nafin.com/portalnf; SEPYME: http://
www.sepyme.gov.ar.
a Although NAFIN itself does not have a specific programme on technological development of SMEs, Mexico does have such programmes,
notably the Subsistema de Desarrollo Tecnológico del Sistema de Centros operated by the Ministry of Public Education (SEP) and the
National Council for Science and Technology (CONACYT).
the lack of outsourcing by Argentina’s SEPYME, there
really is very little variation in terms of degree of market
orientation across cases.
With regard to the intervening variable, degree of
autonomy, there is considerably more variation
(table 5).
Table 6, which gives results for the dependent
variable (level of accountability), shows that Chile’s
CORFO has the highest level of accountability, while
Argentina’s SEPYME has the lowest. Brazil’s SEBRAE
and Mexico’s NAFIN are in the intermediate range.
In each country, it is possible to see an institutional
transition. The institutions have transformed themselves
to become more market-driven, and by and large they
have achieved this goal. Of course, each institution
appears to have employed a different model to achieve
this outcome. Before, Argentina’s SEPYME operated as
a sub-cabinet-level agency, directly under the authority
of the President. Currently, it is under the authority of
the Ministry of Production and coordinates other
agencies to carry out SME programmes. Mexico’s NAFIN
is still in the process of restructuring itself from a
traditional development bank into a more modern one
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TABLE 4
Independent variable: degree to which SME development
institutions are market-driven
Measure: Performance orientation Client focus Market mechanisms
Indicator: Co-financing Client design Outsourcing
SEBRAE/Brazil
Business consulting YES YES YES
Technological development YES YES NO
Business networking YES YES NO
CORFO/Chile
Business consulting YES YES YES
Technological development YES YES NO
Business networking YES YES YES
NAFIN/Mexico
Business consulting YES … NO
Technological development ... ... ...
Business networking YES YES NO
SEPYME/Argentina
Business consulting YES YES YES
Technological development YES YES NO
Business networking YES YES NO
Source: SEBRAE: http://www.sebrae.com.br; CORFO: http://www.corfo.cl; NAFIN: http://www.nafin.com/portalnf; SEPYME: http://
www.sepyme.gov.ar.
TABLE 5
Intervening variable: Degree of autonomy enjoyed
by SME development institutions
Country/Institution Indicators of autonomy Degree of autonomy
Legal status Breadth of representation on the board
Brazil/SEBRAE Private Broad representation High autonomy
Chile/CORFO Public Medium-high representation Medium autonomy
Mexico/NAFIN Public Medium-low representation Low autonomy
Argentina/SEPYME Public Directly under President/Ministry Very low autonomy
Source: SEBRAE: http://www.sebrae.com.br; CORFO: http://www.corfo.cl; NAFIN: http://www.nafin.com/portalnf; SEPYME: http://
www.sepyme.gov.ar.
TABLE 6
Dependent variable: level of accountability
Indicator Accounting of Evaluations of impact Level of
Country/Institution  services provided  of specific programmes accountability
Brazil/SEBRAE YES NO Medium
Chile/CORFO YES PROFOs, FAT, FONTEC (independent, outsourced evaluations) High
Mexico/NAFIN YES NO Medium
Argentina/SEPYME NO NO Low
Source: SEBRAE: http://www.sebrae.com.br; CORFO: http://www.corfo.cl; NAFIN: http://www.nafin.com/portalnf; SEPYME: http://
www.sepyme.gov.ar.
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that works through intermediary agencies and also
incorporates non-financial services into its sphere of
activity. Chile’s CORFO, once a traditional development
bank that increased its level of autonomy, now operates
almost completely through private financial and non-
financial intermediaries. Lastly, Brazil’s SEBRAE is a
unique experiment in Latin America: it is the first
government institution promoting SMEs to have
become a private organization. While all these
institutions have chosen different models or strategies
to pursue their objectives, we can safely say that they
have all become market-driven institutions.
With regard to the intervening variable, the results
mostly confirm our expectations. We hypothesized that
the degree of autonomy (table 5) would determine the
level of accountability of the institutions promoting
SMEs. As it turns out, Chile’s CORFO, whose medium
level of autonomy is the highest of any of the three
public institutions’, also has the highest level of
accountability. It provides multiple, systematic,
independent evaluations of its programmes. It actually
outsources the evaluation of its programmes to
universities in a competitive bid process in order to
ensure that the evaluations will be independent and
unbiased. Argentina’s SEPYME, in contrast, with the
lowest levels of autonomy, has the lowest level of
accountability. Indeed, it does not even provide an
accounting of the number of SMEs it assists, the quantity
of the services it provides to them, etc. In an
intermediate position is Mexico’s NAFIN, which has a
low level of autonomy. Since it does keep track of the
SMEs it assists, but does not do independent evaluations,
we classify it as having a medium level of
accountability. These are the sorts of results our
hypothesis had predicted.
Brazil’s SEBRAE, however, represents a paradox.
Although it has a high level of autonomy, it has only a
medium level of accountability. Upon reflection,
however, the reason seems obvious. SEBRAE is a private
institution with an assured budget, based on the 0.3%
payroll tax on Brazilian businesses. It does not have to
make a budget proposal every year as government
institutions do, and compete for its allocation of
resources. Therefore, SEBRAE does not have an incentive
to provide systematic, independent evaluations of the
impact of its programmes.
Like government agencies, however, SEBRAE must
spend the full amount of money it receives every year;
if not, Brazil’s Congress might decide to reduce the
payroll tax in future years. One way to do this would
be to spend the resources on a large number of
programmes, not only those for SMEs but also
programmes to promote microenterprise development.
This might explain why SEBRAE has such a broad
“coverage”: it has programmes for 17% of all SMEs and
microenterprises in the country, as compared to smaller
numbers for NAFIN (14%) and CORFO (10%), which
focus on SMEs (figures for SEPYME are not available)
(Peres and Stumpo, 2002). Without systematic studies,
however, there is no way to ascertain the impact of this
coverage with any certainty. Indeed, SEBRAE may
provide broad coverage but with low impact or results.
Without greater accountability, it is impossible to know
for sure.
Chile’s CORFO represents an alternative model of
autonomy. In the case of CORFO, the government retains
control of the institution and defines its overall strategic
objective. At the same time, however, CORFO maintains
a degree of legal autonomy because it is organized as a
public corporation, with its own budget and decision-
making capabilities. In addition, CORFO’s Board of
Directors is composed of a broad range of
representatives from the private sector as well as from
a number of different government ministries. Lastly,
CORFO operates almost entirely through private
intermediaries to carry out its work. This structure gives
the institution a great deal of independence from
government political interference, enabling it to carry
out its objectives in a highly systematic and effective
manner. It also explains CORFO’s high level of
accountability: in order to justify continued funding to
such a broad range of interested parties, CORFO has to
provide numerous outsourced, independent evaluations
of every programme that it undertakes.
The outcomes analysed here suggest that to the
extent that government institutions seeking to promote
SMEs are market-driven and possess autonomy, they will
have higher levels of accountability. However,
autonomy alone may not be enough for private
institutions working in this area. Our findings suggest
that private agencies, even highly autonomous ones
such as SEBRAE, need to take steps to ensure their
accountability. One practical suggestion for agencies
with this kind of structure is that they make sure to
build this sort of systematic, outside evaluation of the
impact of their programmes into their practices.
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